Abstract In light of criticism against the Israel National Police in recent years for excessive use of physical force, the personal views of Israeli police officers were elicited regarding the illegal use of force. Personal questionnaires were administered to a sample of police officers who had been investigated for using illegal force against citizens between 1989 and 1997. Informal messages contrary to the organization's formal messages regarding the use of force, and justifying it in certain circumstances and for certain types of offense, seemed highly prevalent, especially among middle-rank police officers. The results obtained provide support for the existence of a deviant organizational subculture.
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individual police officer's work group (Barker and Roebuck, 1974) . Many studies suggest that the majority of violent police officers are quite ordinary people working under stressful occupational conditions conducive to manifestations of violence (Cain, 1973; Chevigny, 1969; Skolnick, 1975; Uildriks and Van Mastrigt, 1991; Westley, 1970) . Notable among these conditions are the organizational socialization of police officers, and particularly the organizational subculture arising from informal on-the-job socialization that sometimes encourages deviant organizational behavior, and consequently becomes a deviant organizational subculture (Barker, 1977; Fyfe, 1993; Gardiner, 1974; Garner, 1977; Street, 1990; Uildriks and Van Mastrigt, 1991) .
The occupational socialization process and the police subculture Beyond childhood and adolescent socialization, and like every new worker in a working organization, the police officer undergoes a process of occupational socialization. Through it, he/she becomes identified as an officer, and begins to adopt a police worldview and to share perspectives relevant to the police role (see Berg, 1990; Klofas et al., 1990; Strecher, 1967) . In general, occupational socialization is a complex process by which an organizational participant learns the required behaviors and supportive attitudes necessary for organizational membership. Its influence on shaping attitudes and beliefs imparts to it the definition as a process of changing, learning, and adopting a new occupational identity (Fielding, 1986; 1988) . This process consists mainly of every worker in every work framework learning and internalizing the behavioral norms, required skills, and the organizational system of expectations. It usually advances on two parallel, sometimes conflicting, levels: the formal or explicit level and the informal level (see Reuss-Ianni, 1984) . The formal level involves the transfer of the information required by the worker to fulfill his or her functions in a manner reflecting the formal spirit and norms of the organization. Essentially, the formal world is defined in abstract and general language because its purpose is not to solve problems but to present types of problems. Moreover, the formal level cannot cover every possible behavioral pattern that may arise in the organizational reality. In practice, due to these limitations, individual workers enjoy some leeway in exercising discretion on the job. Hence an informal level develops, on which the newcomer learns the application of the formal rules, through interaction with more experienced veteran workers. For the new, low-rank worker, this level of socialization represents realistic (as opposed to abstract) training for actual job performance (Fielding, 1988; Reuss-Ianni, 1984; Van Maanen, 1973; Westley, 1970) .
The police academy represents the first overt process of socializing, in which the formal messages of police work are learned [1] . There, new officers interact and become reinforced by others, among them more experienced officers, eventually developing attitudes and behaviors generally consistent with those of other police employees (Fielding, 1986; Fielding and Fielding, 1991) . Moreover, some police training programs are intentionally designed to break Deviant organizational messages
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does not``rat'' on another. In practice, this means that they are increasingly expected to tolerate, although not necessarily condone, misbehavior (violence, corruption) by other officers, and the principle of mutual non-denunciation (thè`B lue Curtain''). Generally, messages of this type are prevalent in deviant organizational subcultures that tolerate and even encourage a degree of deviant behavior (Christopher Commission, 1991; Radelet and Carter, 1994; Uildriks and Van Mastrigt, 1991) . Hence, the deviant behaviors of police officers are not merely a consequence of personality; on the contrary, many of them are likely to be based on wide organizational subcultural perceptions that significantly contradict the declarative formal messages of the organization (Goldstein, 1986; Klockars, 1996; Uildriks and Van Mastrigt, 1991; Westley, 1970[2] .
The Israeli experience Unlike the American model, Israel has only one national police force, the Israel National Police (INP), a highly centralized force, commanded and directed, operationally and organizationally, by its Commissioner who is appointed by the Minister for Internal Security. This national force is organized geographically into six regions or districts and 13 sub-districts, and delivers its services to the public from 70 local police stations, each headed by a local commander. In 1999 the INP had 25,700 serving police officers, the great majority (about 90 per cent) Jewish, with women constituting about 20 per cent of the overall police workforce.
To fulfill its functions, the INP enjoys wide and extraordinary powers, anchored in the law and police regulations. A central feature of such powers is the authority to use a reasonable degree of physical force against citizens if necessary. Nevertheless, recent years have seen a marked increase in media coverage of alleged police brutality by Israeli police officers. It is claimed that illegal physical force is employed quite routinely during arrest, in criminal investigations, in dispersing demonstrations, and even in traffic-control situations. Moreover, some of the allegations in no way refer to acts that might be deemed necessary or justified police action in that they are arbitrary, and usually performed against minorities or groups identified as``typical criminal offenders.'' Such cases usually occur after arrest and are likely to involve humiliations, beatings, maltreatment, and even direct torture resulting in physical injury. These deeds are usually defined by those in command as isolated incidents, expressing only the violent predisposition of the individual police officers involved.
As a result of this coverage, the subject of police violence has featured repeatedly on the Israeli public agenda over the past two decades. Social and political pressure has caused the attention of public committees to be turned with great intensity to police violence (Shimron Committee, 1978; Sirota-Eitan Committee, 1980; Kremnitzer Committee, 1994) , as well as the State Comptroller (1986) , the Ministry of Police Comptroller (1993) , and government and parliamentary committees.
Like the Christopher Commission, Israel's civilian comptrollers mostly focused on the double-edged organizational messages conveyed to low-rank police officers regarding the use of physical force in certain situations or against specific population groups. On the one hand, the formal messages issued by upper-rank commanders emphasized adherence to the rule of law, impeccable conduct, and condemnation of violence. On the other, informal messages were conveyed, especially by experienced and veteran police officers (particularly in the middle ranks), that did not always adhere to declared policy and prohibition of violence. Informal messages of this type defined violence as an effective way of achieving success in the war against crime; therefore, police officers who resorted to violence should be shielded from disciplinary or judicial action against them. Protection of such police officers was achieved by the development of a behavioral pattern of conscious avoidance of, or noninterest in violent incidents ±``turning a blind eye'' (Sirota-Eitan Committee, 1980) . This form of dissociation was reinforced by the omission of reference to the use of physical force in written reports by police officers. When cases of violence did come to light, internal police treatment (both on the investigative and the judicial level) tended to be non-professional, partial, and forgiving. The procedure tended to be prolonged, complaints were refuted, investigations were defective, police investigators covered up for and protected investigated police officers. Judicial verdicts were lenient, and punitive measures were ridiculously light considering the gravity of the charges (Sirota-Eitan Committee, 1980; State Comptroller, 1986; Ministry of Police Comptroller, 1993) .
Following publication of the findings of the above reports, and the consequent public debate, the management level of the INP adopted measures aimed at dealing with the problem: dismissal of violent police officers, improved procedures in the internal discipline courts, and the establishment, in 1992, of an external civilian board of officers (subordinate to the Ministry of Justice) to investigate public complaints against police officers suspected of using illegal force and/or criminal offenses.
The study
As mentioned above, the findings of the civilian comptrollers suggested that deviant organizational messages of violence prevail in the Israeli police force. These conclusions were based mainly on individual testimonies of police officers and/or internal police treatment of suspect police officers investigated for using illegal force. However, unlike the situation in the USA (see Weisburd et al., 1998 as a recent example), the existence of such deviant informal messages had yet to be confirmed by empirical examination of the personal attitudes and perceptions of Israeli police officers regarding this and other faulty behaviors (such as the principle of mutual non-denunciation) in the course of their routine work. Police officers' attitudes to these patterns of work constitute an important area of study, mainly because these attitudes usually play a role in determining the actual behavior of police officers. Accordingly, the study reported here was conducted, examining the issue for the first time in The chosen sample To check the possible existence of deviant attitudes among police officers in Israel, this study focused on personal perceptions of a representative random sample of police officers personally suspected of, and investigated for, employing violence against citizens. Theoretically, one could argue that for valid conclusions, this sample's attitudes should be compared with those of a control group, mainly a representative random sample of police officers against whom illegal use-of-force files were not opened in the years covered by the study (see Geller, 1985, p. 164) . Logically, the author wholly agreed with this methodological position, and submitted a request to the INP to draw such a control sample. Unfortunately, the police management formally allowed research only of the first group, and not a control. The police argument was that the frame of this research offered the police no organizational interest to sanction such a request. Note that because the INP is a national police force, no study on the police can be conducted without its formal permission. Still, despite the methodological limitations, the chosen sample did not consist of a small proportion of violent and deviant police officers (according to the``rotten apple'' theory). It included police officers against whom files were opened, not only those against whom the illegal use of force was substantiated. Indeed the overall official proportion of violence files culminating in the recommendation to take measures against the offending police officers between 1985 and 1997 was only about 14 per cent.
Method
In the investigation of issues of excessive force, survey methods can be used to scan the police, as well as the public (Adams, 1996) . The suspect police officers' individual views were collected by means of an anonymous personal questionnaire. Due to the larger size of this population (about 1,000 police officers per year, some of them obviously appearing more than once during the years), they were administered to a random sample of police officers investigated for the illegal use of force (N = 600) between 1989 and 1997. The questionnaires were sent to the respondents by mail due to their wide dispersal throughout the country [3] . They included both closed and open-ended questions about the issues mentioned above. The closed questions were formulated as multiple-choice, namely respondents were asked to choose the statement nearest to their views (quantitative findings). The open-ended questions offered the respondents blank lines to justify/explain their previous choices (qualitative findings).
A total of 255 questionnaires were completed and returned (a response rate of 44 per cent) [4] , which is hardly surprising. First, the police officers were under no moral or occupational obligation to complete the questionnaire. Moreover, Israeli police officers (generally including senior commanders) mostly perceive external researchers and academics as working against the police interest, so they tend to avoid collaboration with them. Second, the sampling was on a negative personal basis in that all the respondents had been investigated for employing illegal force. Finally, the fact that the questionnaire dealt with extremely sensitive issues may have appeared threatening to many of them. Nevertheless, almost one half of them did respond fully.
The research sample was shown to be a fairly homogeneous group with regard to sex and marital status: almost all the police officers were married men (only two were women). Despite the fact that over 80 per cent of the respondents had 12-15 years of education, less uniformity was obtained for age, length of service, rank, and function. Mean age was 36 (range 24-52), mean length of service was 13 years (range 1-26 years), and although almost all possible ranks and functions in the INP fulfilling traditional police functions were represented, about a third were concentrated in the middle ranks (senior sergeants) and about a third in the higher ranks (officers). Regarding their specific police functions, about a half of them performed many kinds of operational police work (especially patrol functions), about 30 per cent investigative functions (especially detectives), and almost 15 per cent served in the Israel Border Police.
Regarding these characteristics, the research sample seems to be representative of the population of Israeli police officers investigated for illegal use of force, which consequently seems to be representative of the entire Israeli police population. As shown in the Appendix, the adequacy of the statistical representation of some of these variables of our research sample was confirmed by comparison with data for recent years. These had been obtained from the civilian board and covered a wide sample of use-of-force files (over 600) (see Herzog, 1998) , and from the INP, covering the characteristics of the whole police population in Israel [5] .
Variables
Main variables
These were the respondents' answers to several questions regarding:
. The necessity of using violence for increasing effectiveness (agree; disagree). The influence of the wish to avoid complaints about their behavior (to a large/some degree; it is impossible to avoid complaints). 
Support for this code (support; opposed).
.
Characterization of the complainants against them (normative citizens; offenders).
Explanatory variables
These were variables (correct for the time of completing the questionnaire) emerging from the respondents' questionnaires, in three groups:
(1) 
branch. (3)
Features of the use-of-force complaint against him/her: four variables:
. circumstances of the event (arrest; abuse of authority; public disturbance; traffic offense);
. number of accumulated complaints (including those for which the respondent was included in the sample);
. investigative outcomes (sustained/not sustained);
. investigative body (police internal affairs unit; external civilian board). Table I presents the responses to the seven questions defined as dependent variables. As noted, the findings are presented according to the quantitative and qualitative answers of the police officers in the questionnaires.
Results
According to Table I , only about a half of the police officers rejected violent means under any circumstances (almost 60 per cent if we count the police officers who gave a conclusive answer). Justifications for the rejection of violence focused mainly on personal experience, which had taught them that it is possible to do a good and even effective job within the legal limitations of reasonable force. In their opinion, resort to violence by police officers constituted a serious breach of citizens' rights.
On the other hand, one half of all the respondents did not totally reject violent means; about 15 per cent did not express any position on the use of force, and more than a third supported the use of illegal force under certain circumstances. Moreover, these last respondents tended also to reject the possibility of performing certain police actions without exceeding the limits of reasonable or legal force. Three main areas of police activity were mentioned in this context: apprehending drug offenders, dispersing violent demonstrations, and actions (arrest, search) related to individuals defined by the police as`k nown offenders.'' In such instances, these police officers claimed that``the street'' dictated reality; violent behavior by suspects dictated a violent reaction by them. It was virtually impossible to successfully perform the above police actions using``silk gloves or polite language,'' to cite one respondent. To cite another:
My dear sir, have you ever tried to ask a group of people ± for example, a group of demonstrators ± to unblock a street or vacate a public park voluntarily using a megaphone? Have you ever asked a violent criminal to accompany you to a police car, to be met by refusal ± all this in front of the public, citizens, neighbors who expect you to be capable of dealing with criminals? The police officers were also asked whether, and to what extent their behavior in the street was influenced by the wish to avoid complaints, especially in situations in which this possibility was likely. Wide variability on this issue emerged. Almost 60 per cent of the respondents testified to considerations of this type (to a high or to some degree). The remaining 40 per cent, however, reported that it was impossible to avoid complaints if the goal was to produce effective results. About 60 per cent of the respondents thought that citizens' complaints could be avoided by improved training. Suggestions to this end focused mainly on operational preparation and discussion of sensitive police situations liable to lead to the submission of complaints, and on refresher courses on the law, police regulations, and the powers vested in police officers.
Table I also shows that opinions varied with regard to the ability to identify situations in which illegal force was likely to be exercised. More than half of all respondents claimed that it was not possible to identify such situations. Among the others (close to half of the sample), demonstration dispersal clearly headed the list of such situations (about two-thirds of all these responses).
The table shows a more or less equal division of responses with regard to the existence of a code of silence among police officers forbidding mutual denunciation or confession in investigations against colleagues; about 17 per cent did not express any position on the existence of such a code. Support for such a code, to the extent that it exists, was also divided: about a third supported it, a similar proportion did not, and more than a quarter of all respondents failed to express a clear position.
The sampled police officers were finally asked to characterize the specific complainants against them. Respondents generally characterized them in extremely negative terms: almost 70 per cent stated that they were simplỳ`c riminals out to slander them,'' and the others described them as normative citizens with negative attitudes to the police (16.1 per cent) or as criminals who truly believed that illegal force had been used against them (13.3 per cent).
With the seven main variables set out as dichotomized, dependent variables, Table II presents the different logistic regression analysis, indicating the significant logit coefficients of the explanatory variables, serving as prediction variables, in each model. Some pinpointed and isolated significant coefficients were found among the different predictor variables, with regard to the dependent variables. Nevertheless, and as predicted before, the most notable finding in Table II is the large number of statistically significant coefficients between the independent rank variable and the respondents' answers. Accordingly, Table  III gives the details of the statistical differences between the answers and the three central values of the rank variable.
According to Table III, significant differences were found by rank regarding the support of violent means for increasing police effectiveness: in the middle ranks, only fewer than 40 per cent rejected resort to violence, as against about three-quarters in the lower ranks and over half in the higher ranks. If the``don't know'' answers are excluded, support for illegal physical force was especially marked in the middle ranks (more than 60 per cent) and among high-ranking officers (about 40 per cent).
There was considerable variability by rank on the possibility of respondents changing their behavior to avoid complaints. More than 80 per cent of the younger, novice, police officers stated that they attempted to modify their behavior for this purpose. About two-thirds of the middle-ranking police officers were of the opinion that preemptive measures of this type were not possible, and less than half of the high-ranking officers reported modifying their conduct to preempt complaints. From the qualitative data, we learn that the middle-ranking officers especially considered it reasonable and even natural that``professional and good'' police officers involved in arrests and other confrontational actions were likely to be exposed to public complaints. According to this approach, an accumulation of complaints does not necessarily indicate that the suspect police officer is violent but that he or she Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 a Percentages in the parentheses do not contain the``don't know'' responses b The three ranking groups are: low ranks (from``raw police officer'' to``first sergeant'' ± those who have not yet passed all the sergeant's ranking exams); middle ranks ± high sergeants (from``high sergeant'' to``senior high sergeant'' ranks ± those who have passed the first stage but have not yet passed the high officer's ranking exams); and high ranks (from`s ub-inspector'' and up ± those who have passed the second stage) c The statistical tests checked the difference between each column (low, middle or high rank) vs. the others, by the two clear answers (excluding``don't know''), for example, low vs middle and high rank by agree/disagree (df = 1) d In this case, the statistical tests check the difference between each column (low, middle or high rank) vs the others, by the two clear answers together (exist + does not exist) vs.``don't know'' e No significant differences by rank were found on this item 428 works hard and is highly motivated in the police struggle against crime. This stance is often to be found in the personal files of these police officers: they usually receive high evaluations, are recommended for promotion, and they enjoy vigorous protection by their direct commanders against punishment or dismissal.
Concerning the ability to avoid complaints by improving training programs, middle-rank police officers were significantly more pessimistic (only about 40 per cent thought that it was possible) than the lower ranks (about threequarters) and the higher ranks (about two-thirds). In addition, among the lower and middle ranks, more than half claimed that situations in which police violence was likely were identifiable. Among the higher ranks only about a third expressed this opinion.
Regarding the existence of a code of silence among Israeli police officers, significant relationships were also found. With omission of the``don't know'' answers, more than 60 per cent of the high-ranking police officers disclaimed the existence of such a code. In the low and middle ranks, the proportions of those who claimed that such a code did exist and those who disclaimed any such notion were similar (close to 50 per cent). The most important and significant difference was found among those who simply did not know of its existence: only 5 per cent among the low and middle ranks, and more than a third among high-ranking police officers. Moreover, a significant relationship was found between the responses supporting and opposing such a code and rank: about three-quarters of the middle ranks supported it whereas close to 80 per cent of the high-ranking officers opposed it. Among the low ranks, support for and opposition to this code were similar.
Unlike the other examples, no significant difference was found with regard to the relationship between the rank variable and the characterization of complainants. Most of the police officers in every ranking group (from twothirds among the middle-ranking officers to three-quarters among the highranking officers) characterized the complainants as offenders out to slander the respondents.
Discussion
General deviant attitudes: a deviant subculture? As mentioned earlier, an important part of the criticism made by the Israeli civilian comptrollers about the INP in recent years was linked to an apparent deviant organizational subculture, which tolerated and even encouraged violence in certain police contexts. However, unlike the research in other countries, no empirical findings regarding personal views and opinions of Israeli suspect police officers on these issues supported this view. Many of the views evinced by the findings presented here are clearly not compatible with explicit formal police regulations (Table I) : the sampled police officers expressed permissive attitudes towards illegal force in certain situations; they were able to identify events in which illegal force was used; they acknowledged and even supported a code of silence to protect violent police offenders and to Deviant organizational messages 429 cover up their offenses; they expressed pessimism regarding the ability to avoid complaints; and they characterized the complainants in negative terms. Note here that deviant police attitudes, generally or specifically justifying illegal use of force, identifying frequent violent events, and supporting the code of silence among police officers are not unique to Israel. Similar findings (although mostly in lower percentages than in the present study) were also found in surveys conducted among police officers in other countries, mainly the USA (see Carter, 1976; Christopher Commission, 1991; Corbett et al., 1979; Lester and Ten Brink, 1985; Waegel, 1984; Weisburd et al., 1998; Westley, 1970) . Arguably, these deviant attitudes are the direct consequence of a small group of deviant and violent police officers (``rotten apples''), sampled for the study. Various counter-arguments to this view may be offered, despite the absence of a control group for a comparison of these findings. Recall that respondents were not police officers convicted of the use of violent means against citizens, but suspected police officers against whom citizens had filed complaints. Accordingly, pending formal investigation, complaints against police officers represent only subjective claims by citizens who feel they have suffered injustice or injury at the hands of a police officer. For most of them, the commission of the alleged criminal acts has not been proven. In addition, as shown in the Appendix, the sampled respondents in this research tend to represent the large population of suspect police officers in Israel. Moreover, findings from a sample of more than 600 use-of-force files opened in recent years (Herzog, 1998) showed that public complaints were submitted against a very broad group of police officers, not a small proportion of deviant police officers who happened to have accumulated the majority of public complaints. No uniform common denominator was identifiable in the files, and complaints about illegal use of force seemed to occur in all areas of police activity. As in this sample, the police officers who appeared in that larger sample formed a heterogeneous, geographically dispersed group, across a wide range of functions and ranks. This may indicate that the police officers personally suspected of, and investigated for, employing violence against citizens to some extent reflect the entire population of Israeli police officers. It may be concluded with a high degree of certainty that the attitudes expressed in these questionnaires do not originate in individual perceptions or failure to internalize formal regulations by a small deviant group of police officers.
The contrary seems to be the case. The findings set out in Tables II and III about the importance of organizational variables in these attitudes, especially police ranks, indicate that the problem of police violence in Israel seems to be strongly rooted in organizational factors. A deviant organizational subculture, developed in a different manner in different ranking groups, apparently permits deviant behaviors in certain contexts in order to achieve effective job performance.
According to both the quantitative and qualitative data of the research, the problem of police violence in Israel is likely to arise when the demand for effective results, usually in the form of arrests, evidence, confessions, and convictions (for example, due to rising crime rates or an unstable internal security situation) stands in conflict with, or even overrides, other values of police work such as the legality of police actions. Under such conditions, officers feel pressured to evade or bend the rules: it is usually assumed that the police force will be more successful in its struggle against crime and maintaining social order without legal constraints on the deployment of its power and authority originally legislated in order to safeguard civil rights (Morris and Heal, 1981; Sparrow et al., 1990) . The pressure to obtain``results'' may well cause police officers to decide that``always following the rules'' is not compatible with``getting the job done'' (Weisburd et al., 1998, p. 54) , and therefore, to choose``dirty'' but effective police methods, such as use of violence (Skolnick, 1966; Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993) . The dilemma presented by effectiveness as an organizational goal on the one hand, and legality of the means to reach the goal on the other, has been called the``Dirty Harry Dilemma'' (Klockars, 1985) .
The importance of the rank: several police subcultures? With regard to the variables predicting respondents' attitudes (Table II) , logistic regression analysis seemed to indicate the organizational variables as the most significant, among them very clearly their ranking group. The findings are evident concerning the ranks in which these deviant perceptions seem to be more prevalent, hence more internalized (Table III) . Although some of these perceptions were expressed by relatively new police officers, and few of them even by higher-ranking officers serving as supervisors and commanders, they were significantly more prevalent in the study among middle-rank police officers.
According to the present findings, and compatible with the common conclusion of many civilian comptrollers of the police in Israel, the problem of police violence in this country seems to stem from the double message to which police officers are exposed. An overt formal message is disseminated, especially by high-ranking managerial commanders, opposing the use of excessive force under any circumstances; and a covert informal message, emanating mainly from the middle ranks (and adopted in part by lower-rank police officers in the field), condones resort to illegal force in certain contexts. This hidden message is also expressed by the forgiving attitude of middle-rank commanders to manifestations of such violence among their subordinates. This phenomenon often stems from the belief that due process must occasionally be sacrificed in face of the need to use aggressive and illegal methods in maintaining social order and apprehending criminals, which are the main goals of effective police work (Brown, 1981) .
On the theoretical level, these research findings are compatible with ReussIanni's (1983; main conclusion about two different competing organizational police subcultures (see also Bittner, 1984; Reiner, 1985) . On the one hand, the formal management-cop culture, mainly adopted by the highest ranking police commanders,``seeks to maximize the bureaucratic benefits of Deviant organizational messages 431 efficient organization, rational decision making, cost-effective procedures, and objective accountability at all levels of policing '' (Reuss-Ianni, 1984, p. 6) . On the other hand, the more informal street-cop culture, mainly adopted by middleranking police officers working in the streets, takes the``good old days'' conception as the organizing ethos of policing. Then, . . . being a policeman was something special: a cop put his life on the line and people appreciated and respected his willingness to do so. As a result, policemen were allowed to do their jobs without too many questions or too much interference from outside the department (Reuss-Ianni, 1984, pp. 1-2).
Accordingly, in large police organizations (such as the Israel Police), police subculture does not seem to be monolithic. Several``sub-subcultures,'' so to speak, probably exist: one at the line level, another at the supervisory and middle management level, and yet another at the upper administrative level. Some attitudes and values will be common to all levels, some will differ and even conflict (Radelet and Carter, 1994, pp. 189-90) . From the significant differences in respondents' attitudes by their ranking group (Table III) , and also from the stages of the socialization process described above, it may be concluded that the extent to which police officers conform to the occupational subculture (i.e. legitimate and deviant organizational messages) changes in relation to their progress in the rank hierarchy. These views (and even this subculture) are expressed differently by different police ranking groups. According to Lefkowitz (1974) , Perrott and Taylor (1995) , and Weisburd et al. (1998) , attitudinal differences among police officers can be understood by their ranking groups: as they ascend the rank hierarchy and become supervisors, they tend to identify more with the high commanders' organizational attitudes and formal regulations, and consequently, less with the informal subculture. As they reduce their daily and frustrating contact with the most problematic groups of the public, and increase their direct contact with the media, politicians, and community leaders, they become more circumspect about expressing deviant attitudes, in order to protect the force. However, the findings of the present study seem to indicate that this`s upervisors vs non-supervisors'' dichotomy is not enough to explain these attitudinal differences among police officers. Although the various stages of the socialization process should not be interpreted as a rigid linear model (Fielding, 1986, p. 328) , through them the significant differences among the three ranking groups may be explained, as shown in Table III , in an alternative manner (for a similar interpretation based on police officers' age, see Ferdinand, 1980) . Most of the rookies, who are in the initial stages of their careers and still under the influence of the formal messages, tend to express perceptions that are closer to the formal regulations learned at the police academy (see Fielding and Fielding, 1991) . However, the first period on the job may constitute a rude awakening for many new officers, what Westley describes as``reality shock' ' (1970, pp. 159-60; see also Fielding, 1986) . If a deviant street subculture does exist in the police force, the findings may indicate that a few of them have already adopted some of its deviant messages. By contrast, most of the middle-ranking police officers (specifically sergeants, some of them supervisors), who have accumulated expertise, length of service, and also wear, and have learned about the gap between formal learning and reality, tend to express more``instrumental'' perceptions of the job (see Cook, 1977) , that are opposed to the formal regulations and consequently closer to the deviant street subculture. Finally, there are high-ranking police officers, who have not yet reached managerial positions (but aspire to them), and have continued fulfilling traditional police duties as commanders and supervisors. They have also undergone a tough selection process to get to their position. They gradually identify more with the high commanders' views, hence with the formal regulations, especially compared with the middle ranks. A conclusion of this study is that although different variables may be used as predictors of personal police attitudes (most of them on the organizational level), individual views seem to be mainly influenced by the stages of the socialization process they have gone through. These stages are expressed in their ranking group and they also display different intensities of identification with these messages [6] .
The complainants as criminals An additional aspect of the research is the characterization of the complainant population in highly negative terms, the majority of them being defined as criminals out to slander police officers personally (Table I) . Unlike Butler and Cochrane (1977) , who found that experienced officers have more unfavorable perceptions of citizens than do new recruits, this conception seems to be general in this study, and no significant difference was found among the different ranking groups (Table III) .
Complainants against police officers are generally defined by the latter as young aggressive males, of low socioeconomic status, without a permanent job or unemployed, with previous convictions, and holding anti-police attitudes [7] . Evidence of this characterization is provided by two observations made by the police. One refers to a large number of false complaints against police officers, and the other to the simplicity of the complaint process, which allows criminals to submit malicious complaints with the sole aim of turning the investigative authorities' attention away from the suspect and onto the police officers (see Lustgarten, 1986) .
Regarding the situation in Israel, the accuracy of these police officers' characterizations of the complainants was not confirmed empirically (see Herzog, 1998) . Complainants there formed an extremely heterogeneous group with regard to variables such as age, education, family status, and occupation. Moreover, for more than 90 per cent of them, the listed complaint was their first ever submitted against a police officer. Moreover, reports submitted by the Ministry of Police Comptroller (1993) and the Kremnitzer Committee (1994) contain evidence that not only did police officers tend to dismiss the credibility of complainants, they even submitted false complaints against suspects in the face of actual or threatened complaints against them. In this context, based on Sykes and Matza's (1957) ``techniques of neutralization,' ' Box and Russell (1975) and Waegel (1984) suggested that a police suspect, like any other suspect, tends Deviant organizational messages
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to use several techniques in order to avoid the``deviant'' label and punishment. Among them are``condemnation of the condemners'' (deflection of the focus of attention away from the offense and onto the reasons that led them to act in an illegal manner) and``denial of the victim'' (the denial of the existence of a victim by his /her transformation into someone who deserves to be hurt due to his/her affiliation with a negative group in society, for example, the criminal group). Similarly to the general findings, this negative police characterization of complainants was seen also as a part of deviant police subcultures, and consequently it was directed not only against them. In many cases a great part of the general public was seen as hostile, untrustworthy, and potentially violent (Christopher Commission, 1991) . According to Westley (1970) , this subcultural symptom mainly results from the police never meeting private citizens on particularly good terms; most meetings are selective, with citizens who would prefer no contact with the police. Skolnick (1966) observes that the police officer's attitude toward work is much like that of a combat soldier: life is combat; people are either good or bad; the situation is safe or unsafe. It is a``us vs them'' attitude, the former consisting of other police officers, the latter encompassing almost everybody else. Accordingly, the subculture requires secrecy, mutual support, and unity on the part of the police.
Conclusions
The existence of an organizational subculture is a normal and inevitable phenomenon in all organizations. It is influenced directly by work conditions and its messages sometimes deviate from the formal organizational messages. In the police context, a deviant organizational subculture usually includes the exercise of violence against certain citizens and in certain situations. Similarly to findings for other police forces, this seems to be the source of the anomalous attitudes expressed by our research sample. These findings, together with evidence provided by external factors and public criticism, support the conclusion that the illegal use of force by Israeli police officers in general, and cover-up for such offenses by colleagues in the police department, are related to a deviant organizational subculture of the organization.
However, these findings also show that this police subculture seems not to be homogeneous and unique along the rank lines; on the contrary, this study indicated that police officers greatly vary in their attitudes (and consequently in their behavior). We should be careful not to confuse the general police subculture common to all police officers with various police sub-subcultures (see Worden, 1996, pp. 29-30) . Like the relationship between the dominant culture of a society and various smaller subcultures (such as that of the police), members of these sub-subgroupings, while sharing in many of the dominant police subculture's values, norms, and other social ideas and patterns, differ distinctly in some manner. Because the organizational (normative and deviant) subculture is acquired through informal socialization, and because it is decisively influenced by the combination of proximity to the field, length of service, experience, and wear, its patterns are more internalized among middleranking police officers.
Similarly to police situations in other countries, the existence of illegitimate organizational messages in Israel can be seen as expressions of a conflict between two main values of the organization. These are adherence to the rule of law, which emphasizes the safeguarding of human rights and legal constraints on the powers vested in the police, and``organizational effectiveness,'' which emphasizes preservation of social order and prevention of crime by means of professional and assertive police action. In some police departments, in which this conflict is solved by giving preference to``producing results'' at the expense of upholding the principle of basic civil rights,``effective'' means achieving the goal in a shorter time (Klockars, 1985) .
To make changes in a police subculture that permits and even encourages resort to violence and other illegitimate means in its routine work, it is recommended that a series of preventive organizational/general measures be adopted that might, directly or indirectly, influence the informal organizational subculture. Among the suggestions contained in the literature are the following: gradual change towards community models of policing; improvement of police recruitment criteria; reinforcement of internal mechanisms for identifying potentially violent police officers; changes in police training programs to incorporate the study of situations likely to provoke police violence and avoidance of the use of illegal force; changes in organizational evaluation criteria by emphasizing and rewarding appropriate means rather than goal attainment per se; prevention or avoidance of situations known to induce police violence; and application of data from the complaints systems to identify``problematic'' situations, functions, and units.
Formal rules and regulations, no matter how sophisticated, cannot constitute a control mechanism merely by virtue of the threat of negative sanction that they contain. The efficacy of a rule is measured by its capacity to be internalized by the people whose conduct it tries to regulate. They have to be convinced as to its justification and rationality (O'Leary and Duffee, 1971; Stone, 1975, p. 228) . It is suggested that normative conduct by police officers can be achieved more readily if it is not merely attained through fear of punishment (Smith and Gray, 1983) . A recommended way to reach this goal is to involve middle-rank police officers in the process of formal legislation and organizational enforcement of the rules and regulations, and in this way to try to reduce the perceived gap between the formal world and the frustrating and complicated reality in the field, which produces the conditions for the development of a deviant organizational subculture. Traditionally, as a result of the adoption of a quasi-military model, the determination of policy and regulations has always been perceived as a privilege of the high command, without any participation of lower-rank commanders. In the spirit of the wide organizational change towards new models of community policing, taking into account the views of the latter regarding the form and content of formal regulations is likely to increase the probability of their compliance with them (Goldsmith, 1990) .
Deviant organizational messages
435 Notes 1. It is also argued that the occupational socialization process begins before an individual becomes a regular member of the occupation, based on his/her demands and expectations of it (see Brim and Wheeler, 1966; Klofas et al., 1990) . 2. A negative direction taken by an entire police department is exemplified in the Christopher Commission report (1991) on the Los Angeles Police Force after the media exposure of the Rodney King case. 3. Anonymity was especially important in this study because of the sensitive nature of the issues examined. To enhance motivation, the questionnaires were accompanied by a personal letter detailing the research goals, emphasizing the importance of completing the questionnaire, assuring anonymity and that no personal identifying details would be revealed to any judicial, academic, or police body, that the sampling method was random, and that the findings would be used for statistical purposes only. Moreover, the questionnaires were not designed as self-reports for respondents to describe their deviant (and even criminal) behavior, but for the elicitation of personal views and attitudes mainly around general issues and other police officers' behavior (see Adams, 1996, pp. 74-5) .
Comprehensibility of the questionnaire was verified by a pre-test administered to a small number of subjects. 4. About 3.5 per cent came back in the mail because the addresses to which they were sent were incorrect. 5. The civilian board, and especially the INP, were not able to provide updating data regarding all the relevant variables. 6. As Perrott and Taylor pointed out (1995, p. 338), a considerable difference in the police rank hierarchy exists also between Israel and other Western countries, so any attempt to draw exact rank equivalencies between countries is problematic. 7. Studies conducted in England (Maguire and Corbett, 1991) and in Scotland (Uildriks and Van Mastrigt, 1991) found that this description of complainants in the case of suspected illegal use of force conformed to the above stereotype.
